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A MORAL STANDARD FOR THE
PROSECUTOR'S EXERCISE OF THE
CHARGING DISCRETION.
Bennett L. Gershman *
I. Introduction
The prosecutor's decision to institute criminal charges is the
broadest and least regulated power in American criminal law. The
judicial deference shown to prosecutors generally is most noticeable
with respect to the charging function. Limited constitutional and
statutory constraints on charging are manifested in the presumption
of prosecutorial good faith, and are reflected in the courts' acknowl-
edgment that they lack the knowledge and expertise to supervise the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion.' The Separation of Powers doc-
trine merely reinforces this policy of judicial noninterference. To the
extent that sufficient evidence exists, and no improper motivation is
shown, the charging decision is virtually immune from legal attack.2
This is not to say that the prosecutor's discretion is unbounded.
Various legal,3 political,4 experiential 5 and ethical considerations 6 in-
form and guide the charging decision. Still, no subject in criminal law
is as elusive as that of prosecutorial discretion in the charging process.
A large body of literature has addressed the problem of ensuring re-
sponsible decision-making by persons who are authorized to make
complex and controversial evaluations of harm, proof, and culpability
in a system that allows them virtually unfettered power to make mo-
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
1. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
2. The doctrines of selective, vindictive, and bad faith prosecutions provide modest
constraints on the prosecutor's charging power. See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 4.3-4.5 (1985).
3. Legal considerations include an evaluation of the strength of the case, the credi-
bility of complainants and witnesses, the existence and admissibility of corroborating
proof, and the nature and strength of the defense.
4. Political considerations include an assessment of the harm caused by the offense,
the availability of investigative and litigation resources, the existence of non-criminal al-
ternatives, and an alertness to relevant social and community concerns.
5. Experiential considerations include the prosecutor's background, training, experi-
ence, intuition, judgment, and common sense.
6. Ethical considerations involve a sensitive appreciation that in the context of the
above factors, the ends of justice would be served by criminal prosecution, and that
neither personal, political, discriminatory, nor retaliatory motives have influenced the
charging decision.
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mentous choices that can destroy a person's reputation, liberty, and
even life itself.7
This Essay does not attempt to retrace the subject of prosecutorial
discretion from the standpoint of the controlling factors, doctrinal
limitations, or norms of conduct applicable to prosecutors generally.
Rather, it addresses the charging process in a narrower compass. It
poses three hypothetical cases that present both realistic and recur-
rent challenges to the prosecutor's charging power. The first case de-
pends on a factual determination of a witness's reliability; the second
case depends on a factual determination of a witness's truthfulness;
the third case revolves around not a factual determination but, rather,
a legal determination regarding the applicability of a defense.
Through these cases we can examine the circumstances that might
lead an ethical prosecutor to institute or decline to institute criminal
charges when she believes that the defendant is probably guilty, that
prosecution of this particular crime would be consistent with the pub-
lic interest, and that legally sufficient and admissible proof exists to
convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
They provide the setting in which a moral standard is proposed to
guide the prosecutor's discretion.
II. Three Hypothetical Cases
A. A Robbery Case
Steven, a white, thirty-five-year-old accountant, was returning
home from work on January 2 1st. He entered his apartment building
at 5:30 p.m. and waited in the lobby for the elevator. The lobby is
illuminated by recessed lighting in the ceiling, but visibility is not as
clear as it would be in daylight. As Steven waited, a male darted up
to him from somewhere in the lobby, put a sharp-looking object to
Steven's midsection, and demanded Steven's wallet. Steven quickly
fumbled for his wallet and gave it to him. The male fled out the front
door of the building. There were no witnesses.
Entering his apartment, Steven immediately dialed 911 to report
the crime. The police arrived in about twenty minutes and took a
statement. Steven, clearly unsettled by the experience, described his
assailant as a black male, dark complexion, about six feet tall, stocky
build, and wearing a green jacket and dungarees. He reported that
the event took less than a minute, but that he believed he could iden-
tify the person if he saw him again.
7. Some of the literature supporting this proposition is noted in Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 405 n.74 (1992).
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Three days later, the police called Steven and asked him to come to
the police station to look at photographs. There, Steven was asked to
look through a large folder filled with several hundred "mug-shots,"
and to advise the police if he recognized the person who robbed him.
The photographs were chosen based on Steven's description, and con-
stituted a fair sample of persons with relatively similar appearances.
After examining the photographs for more than an hour, Steven chose
two pictures, and after looking carefully at the two for about five min-
utes, selected the picture of the person whom he recognized as the
person who robbed him.
The man Steven identified, Fred, was located by the police and
asked to come to the police station. After he arrived, Fred was placed
in a line-up with five other males of similar appearance. Steven viewed
the line-up carefully and positively identified Fred as the perpetrator.
Fred was arrested on a charge of robbery in the first degree. A search
of Fred's apartment yielded no tangible proof linking Fred to Steven's
robbery. Fred, a thirty-two-year-old African American, has a record
of two previous arrests within the past five years for narcotics posses-
sion offenses. One charge was dismissed and Fred pleaded guilty to
the other and received a sentence of six months. Fred matched the
general description that Steven had given the police with the excep-
tion of a noticeable scar on his forehead, which Steven never men-
tioned. At his arraignment, Fred pleaded not guilty, and was
remanded to the county jail since he was unable to post the $5,000
bail. Fred's public defender has informed the prosecutor that Fred
claims he had nothing to do with the robbery, was in a different part
of the city at the time, but has no alibi witness to support this claim.
Fred refuses to plead guilty to second degree robbery, which the pros-
ecutor's office routinely offers.
Prior to deciding what charges to institute, the prosecutor inter-
viewed Steven.' Steven is intelligent and articulate. He is emphatic
that he has identified the right person. If a jury believes Steven's testi-
8. Each of these hypotheticals allows the prosecutor some lead time between the
defendant's arrest by the police and the prosecutor's charging decision, thereby enabling
the prosecutor to evaluate the case with greater care. In busy prosecutors' offices, particu-
larly in urban areas, the huge volume of cases may require more expeditious case process-
ing and impose substantial time constraints on the thoroughness of the investigation and
evaluation. These pressures are not incompatible with responsible and non-mechanical
decision-making. For example, the most experienced prosecutors could be assigned to the
earliest stages of the decision-making process, or in the unit that determines whether
felony charges will be sought. Similarly, policies could be adopted that require more ex-
tensive investigation in cases that traditionally have presented difficult factual or legal
choices. The hypothetical cases in this Essay represent prototypes of the kinds of situa-
tions that might require more extensive investigation before instituting formal charges.
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mony, Fred will be found guilty. However, the prosecutor knows that
the case has weaknesses, i.e., Steven's limited opportunity to observe
his assailant, his failure to recall the scar, the lack of any corroborat-
ing evidence, Steven's initial selection of two photographs from the
array, and the cross-racial nature of the identification. Moreover, the
prosecutor is aware that eyewitness identifications historically have
resulted in innocent persons being wrongfully convicted. Neverthe-
less, on the basis of Steven's convincing testimony, the prosecutor
knows from experience that a jury could very likely convict. The
prosecutor is preparing the case for charging purposes. Should the
prosecutor charge Fred with robbery? What degree of moral confi-
dence should guide the prosecutor's decision?
B. A Rape Case
Jane went to the police station on Monday evening with the follow-
ing account. She stated that on the previous Saturday evening, she
had a date with Ed. She had never dated Ed before. Jane is twenty-
eight and unmarried. She has been an associate in a large law firm for
four years. She first met Ed, an attorney in another law firm, at an
office party. Jane and Ed struck up a conversation, and she found
him pleasant and engaging. Before leaving, Ed asked Jane if he could
call her. She said yes, and gave him her unlisted telephone number.
Ed called her the following week and they made a date for dinner on
Saturday evening. The dinner was enjoyable, and Jane invited Ed
back to her apartment for coffee.
There, after casual conversation for about an hour, while seated
together on the sofa, Ed reached for Jane and tried to kiss her. Mov-
ing away from him, Jane told Ed that it was very late, she was tired
and wanted to retire, and asked him if he would please leave. At these
remarks, Ed suddenly became agitated, appeared surprised, and
reached for Jane again, stating that he did not want to leave, and that
he wanted to make love to her. Jane said "No" firmly, and again
asked Ed to leave. However, Ed was much taller and heavier than
Jane, and as he held her arms and spoke with such insistence, Jane
observed an intense look in his eyes that frightened her. She believed
that if she tried to resist him physically, Ed would harm her. She
acquiesced, and allowed Ed to have sexual intercourse with her. Jane
did not seek medical or other assistance, and told no one about the
incident. Two days later, feeling deeply depressed, she went to the
police station to make a formal charge of rape against Ed. Based on
her complaint, the police arrested Ed.
The prosecutor has interviewed Jane. She has given a credible ac-
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count of the event. The prosecutor questioned her very closely, and
there did not appear to be any motive for her to accuse Ed of rape
falsely. Ed's lawyer discussed the case with the prosecutor, stating
that his client did have intercourse with Jane that night, but that it
was voluntary and consensual on Jane's part, and that Jane even
called Ed the next day to tell him that she had a nice time. When
asked about the telephone call, .which Jane did not mention during
her initial interview with the prosecutor, Jane admitted that she was
angry and depressed, and called Ed, asking him in a crying voice how
he could do such a horrible thing to her. There is nothing in Ed's
background or character that would suggest his having committed
this crime, nor anything in Jane's background or character that would
suggest any motive to fabricate the accusation. There is no corrobora-
tion of Jane's account.
The prosecutor believes Jane is telling the truth. However, the
prosecutor has no basis other than Jane's assertion to disbelieve Ed.
The prosecutor believes that a jury could convict Ed on the basis of
Jane's testimony, there being sufficient proof of Jane's lack of consent,
and the necessary force, or the threat of force. The prosecutor also
knows from experience that juries are much more sensitive to charges
of rape by nonstrangers, and are more likely to convict than ever
before. Should the prosecutor institute charges of forcible rape?
What degree of moral confidence should guide the prosecutor's
decision?
C. A Murder Case
Ella had been married to Don for six years. They had one child,
Tina, who is five years old. During virtually the entire period of the
marriage, Don physically abused Ella. Don often drank excessively,
and it was on these occasions that he would become most brutal. Ella
summoned the police on several of these occasions when Don was out
of control and the beatings were most violent, the last time being one
week earlier. Ella went to the hospital on these occasions. Police and
medical records confirm these facts, and describe Ella's injuries. Nev-
ertheless, Ella was in love with Don, and because of their longstand-
ing relationship, and for the sake of their child, she never initiated
criminal charges against him, did not seek court orders of protection,
and never left the household. Following the periods of abuse, Don
would cry and ask Ella for forgiveness. Ella always forgave him.
Until the evening of June 5th. That evening, Don, drinking heavily
and in a rage, punched Tina in her head for spilling her milk. Don
had never before struck Tina so viciously. When Ella screamed at
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
him and sought to intervene, Don beat her repeatedly on her head and
body with a broom handle. Don shouted that if Ella ever questioned
his authority again, he would kill her. Ella, in terror, locked herself
and Tina in the bathroom. Don left the apartment. He returned two
hours later, undressed, and went to bed. Ella, under emotional shock
and confusion, went into the kitchen and obtained a knife. She
walked into the bedroom and stabbed Don, killing him. Ella immedi-
ately called the police and told them what happened. They arrested
her on a charge of murder.
Ella's lawyer has informed the prosecutor of his client's version of
the events, part of which Tina has confirmed, and has asked the pros-
ecutor to review the report of Dr. Wall, a highly respected clinical
psychologist who has treated battered women, has written in schol-
arly journals about forensic issues concerning the "Battered Women's
Syndrome," and has testified as an expert witness in many criminal
and civil proceedings involving this issue. Dr. Wall's lengthy report
details the relationship between Ella and Don and provides considera-
ble factual data for his conclusion that under the circumstances, on
the night of the killing, Ella was in a state of shock, was afraid for her
life and that of her child, and believed that she and her child were in
danger of being killed by Don. Dr. Wall concluded that Ella's belief
under the circumstances was reasonable.
The prosecutor, from background and experience, is sensitive to is-
sues of domestic violence. The prosecutor does not doubt that Ella
believed that the only way to protect her life and that of her child was
to take her husband's life. The prosecutor has no reason to dispute
Dr. Wall's conclusions that Ella was a battered victim who felt she
had no other recourse than to kill her husband. The prosecutor
knows from experience, however, that juries tend to reject the bat-
tered spouse syndrome as a defense to murder, and would probably
find her guilty. Ella would then be subject to a mandatory sentence of
fifteen years to life imprisonment. Should the prosecutor charge the
defendant with murder? What degree of moral confidence should
guide the prosecutor's decision?
III. The Decision-Making Process
These cases share several common characteristics. Each involves a
serious felony; each involves a violent crime that commands the high-
est priority in a prosecutor's office and consequently does not realisti-
cally raise concerns over allocating scarce resources. Moreover, there
is legally sufficient admissible evidence to charge each of these defend-
ants with robbery, rape, and murder, respectively, and to convince a
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jury of each defendant's guilt. Further, these cases are within the
prosecutor's jurisdiction and cannot be referred to a different
prosecutorial or correctional agency.
Analysis of these cases rests on the same body of assumptions.
First, the prosecutor in each of these cases is acting responsibly with a
view toward seeking justice for the victim, the accused, and society.
Second, the prosecutor does not want to prosecute an innocent per-
son, and does not want to see a guilty person go free. Third, the pros-
ecutor is concerned that an acquittal can have a negative effect on her
reputation, or engender public cynicism about the weaknesses of the
criminal justice system. Despite this, the prosecutor would not let
embarrassment or public criticism over a possible acquittal prevent an
otherwise valid prosecution.
How will the prosecutor arrive at a decision? What factors will she
look to? It is unlikely that the prosecutor's decision in any of these
cases will be influenced by external constraints, such as constitutional,
statutory, or ethical proscriptions, or the existence of internal
prosecutorial guidelines. Constitutional and statutory rules merely
set the outer boundaries for decision-making, requiring only that the
prosecutor have sufficient evidence to convict and that she not engage
in discriminatory or retaliatory behavior. 9 Ethical rules go further,
and mandate that the prosecutor seek justice.'0 Although the obliga-
tion to seek justice can provide an effective restraint on prosecutorial
overreaching, the concept is presently too vague to provide meaning-
ful guidance. I  Moreover, although official guidelines theoretically
could address the specific cases involving uncorroborated "one-wit-
ness" identifications, uncorroborated "date-rape" accusations, or do-
mestic violence cases involving claims of self-defense predicated on
the battered-spouse defense, guidelines by their nature tend to articu-
late general policies of prosecution. Most likely, guidelines could not
be sufficiently explicit to regulate prosecutorial discretion in fact-spe-
cific cases.' 2 Further, an institutional reluctance to unduly restrict
9. See GERSHMAN, supra note 2.
10. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1992) ("The duty of
the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); NDAA NATIONAL PROSECU-
TION STANDARDS § 1.1 (2d ed. 1991) ("The primary responsibility of prosecution is to
see that justice is accomplished.").
11. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice? 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
12. For instance, guidelines might establish the following policies: what possession
charge to bring when a weapon is discovered in a home or place of business; what larceny
charge to bring when the value of stolen property does not exceed a certain amount; when
to upgrade an unlawful trespass into a burglary charge; when to charge an automobile
theft as a felony rather than a misdemeanor. On the other hand, guidelines could not
519
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their own discretion makes it even more unlikely that prosecutors
would promulgate overly specific guidelines.
Since these cases present difficult challenges to the exercise of dis-
cretion, the prosecutor may consider other institutional options that
might allow her to avoid making these difficult decisions, and thereby
be absolved from the responsibility for making the wrong decision.
Consider the following: Would it be appropriate for the prosecutor
simply to present the matter to a grand jury and let the grand jury
decide whether to bring criminal charges? Would it be appropriate
for the prosecutor to institute formal charges in the expectation that
the defendant probably would plead guilty to a reduced charge?
Would it be appropriate for the prosecutor to bring charges in the
belief that if the case ultimately did go to trial, a jury reflecting the
conscience of the community would do the right thing?
Although recourse to a grand jury might be politically expedient, in
reality it does not lessen the prosecutor's ultimate charging responsi-
bility. There is an assumption that the grand jury controls the charg-
ing function. This assumption is false. Anybody familiar with the
criminal justice system knows that the grand jury does not act on its
own and that the prosecutor controls grand jury action. 13 Moreover,
as a corollary to this power to control the grand jury, the prosecutor
also has the ability to use the grand jury in order to be insulated from
unpopular decision-making. Grand jury action can cloak with legiti-
macy decisions that the prosecutor wants to make but for which she
does not wish to appear to take personal responsibility.
This ability to use the grand jury in order to depersonalize and vali-
date prosecutorial decision-making was seen recently in the contro-
versial case in Washington Heights, New York, which involved the
fatal shooting by a police officer of a reputed drug dealer. The killing
attracted widespread media attention and led to rioting. Following a
lengthy investigation, the prosecutor concluded that the police officer
acted in self-defense. 4 Rather than declining to institute charges on
his own, however, the prosecutor presented the case to the grand jury.
Why did he do this? Probably to allay public suspicion that he was
acting arbitrarily, and to make it appear that the decision not to bring
charges was not his decision, but rather the decision of a group of
public-minded citizens who, after careful consideration of the evi-
articulate how a prosecutor should weigh degrees of credibility or degrees of certainty,
considerations which are often at the core of the prosecutor's charging decision.
13. MARVIN FRANKEL & GARY NAFrALIS, THE GRAND JURY 21-23 (1977).
14. The Washington Heights Case: District Attorney's Findings Regarding the Killing
of Jose Garcia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at B2.
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dence, decided not to indict the officer. In sum, regardless of the rea-
son why prosecutors decide to present a matter to a grand jury, in
reality they are still responsible for the charging decision.
Would it be proper for the prosecutor to bring criminal charges in
.the expectation that the defendant probably would later accept a
favorable plea offer to a reduced charge? It is improper for prosecu-
tors to use overcharging as a leverage device to more readily obtain
guilty pleas or to provide a trial jury a broader range of charges that
might more readily produce a compromise verdict."5 However, prov-
ing such improper prosecutorial motivation is virtually impossible. 6
Moreover, this option is tactically unwise as well as unethical. Since
the prosecutor cannot control the defendant's decision-making, the
prosecutor cannot ensure that the defendant inevitably will accept a
plea offer. The prosecutor may be forced to fully litigate a charge that
arguably should not have been brought in the first place, and that may
result in a wrongful conviction.
Finally, is it proper for a prosecutor to bring charges in a close case
in the expectation that if the case ultimately goes to trial, a jury will
be entrusted to determine the truth, thereby absolving the prosecutor
from the moral responsibility of convicting an innocent person? The
central theme of this Essay goes to precisely this question. To what
extent should the prosecutor allow the jury system to resolve close
questions of guilt rather than grappling with those questions indepen-
dently? One of the major flaws in this option is the assumption that
juries always do the right thing and do not make mistakes. To the
extent that juries are politically motivated, succumb to inflammatory
appeals, or rely on ambiguous or uncertain proof, they can convict
innocent persons. Although the adjudicatory process attempts to
minimize the risk of jury error, its procedural protections come into
play only after the prosecutor has made the independent judgment
that criminal prosecution is appropriate. Under my thesis, rather
than pass this responsibility to the jury, then, the prosecutor functions
almost literally as a gatekeeper of justice with the obligation to pre-
vent an injustice before the system, if left to its own devices,
miscarries.
15. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9(f) (3d ed. 1992); NDAA NA-
TIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 43.4 (2d ed. 1991).
16. United States v. Fine, 644 F.2d 1018, 1022 n.13 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1977); State v. Pulawa, 569 P.2d 900, 905 (Haw.
1977).
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IV. A Moral Standard for Decision-Making
Once it is agreed that a prosecutor cannot avoid the charging deci-
sion by recourse to the kinds of options noted above, it is necessary to
examine how a responsible prosecutor should approach the charging
decisions presented in each of the hypothetical cases. I am not sug-
gesting that there is one correct decision. My objective is less to sug-
gest any particular charging result than it is to provoke inquiry into
the degree of moral confidence that a prosecutor should have before
bringing criminal charges. My thesis is that the prosecutor should
engage in a moral struggle over charging decisions, and should not
mechanically initiate charges. First, the prosecutor should apply all
of the legal, political, experiential, and ethical factors noted above.1 7
After considering these factors, and before making the ultimate deci-
sion to charge, the prosecutor should then assure herself that she is
morally certain that the defendant is both factually and legally guilty,
and that criminal punishment is morally just. This standard of moral
certainty governs the resolution of the three hypotheticals: it applies
to charging decisions involving the reliability of a witness, the credi-
bility of a complainant, and the applicability of a defense."8
Why a standard of moral certainty? Such a standard fits the reality
that the prosecutor is the gatekeeper of justice. It requires the prose-
cutor to engage in a rigorous moral dialogue in the context of factual,
political, experiential, and ethical considerations. It also requires the
prosecutor to make and give effect to the kinds of bedrock value judg-
ments that underlie our system of justice - that the objective of con-
victing guilty persons is outweighed by the objective of ensuring that
innocent persons are not punished.' 9 Under this precept, society
bears the cost of the prosecutor's moral uncertainty, rather than the
defendant. Finally, the prosecutor who acknowledges moral uncer-
tainty about a defendant's guilt but decides nonetheless to bring
17. See supra notes 3-6.
18. The term "moral certainty" is used in criminal cases based solely on circumstan-
tial evidence. In such cases, the term is intended to convey to the jury the high level of
confidence that the jury must have to convict. People v. Barnes, 406 N.E.2d 1071 (N.Y.
1980). My use of the term in this Essay requires that same degree of confidence on the
part of the prosecutor in bringing charges. It requires the prosecutor to engage in a
process of rigorous intellectual and emotional scrutiny and to act only if that scrutiny
yields a conclusion that is so personally compelling that the prosecutor would not hesitate
to act on that decision in vital matters affecting the prosecutor's own life. In short, only if
the prosecutor would herself convict on that charge should the prosecutor institute that
charge.
19. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (there exists "a fundamental value deter-
mination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.") (Harlan, J., concurring).
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charges, violates the prosecutor's special obligation to seek justice,
and tacitly invites the system to miscarry.
A. The Robbery Case
The robbery case presents the question of the degree of moral confi-
dence that the prosecutor must have in a witness's reliability. The
overriding challenge for the prosecutor in such cases is to make an
assessment of the degree of reliability of the witness's identification, so
that the prosecutor can feel morally certain that Fred is guilty and
that punishing him would be proper. Thus, the prosecutor is not re-
quired to decide, nor usually able to decide, whether the complaining
witness is telling the truth. The prosecutor in such cases does not
doubt the victim's sincerity, i.e., that he honestly believes that he has
accurately identified his assailant. The critical question for the prose-
cutor is not whether Steven is positive but whether he is right.
Several factors undermine the prosecutor's moral certainty of
Fred's guilt. There is no corroborative proof that might confirm the
accuracy of Steven's identification. No property was recovered that
might link Fred to the crime. Fred gave no false alibi, and made no
other statements that might have implied a consciousness of guilt.20
Fred has no significant criminal history, e.g., a background involving
robbery or other crimes of violence.21 Steven's description of Fred
omits any detailed, distinctive, or unique attributes - i.e., a scar, hair
style, or tone of voice - that might enhance the prosecutor's confi-
dence in Steven's identification. Although Steven seems to be an in-
telligent and perceptive person, the amount of time he had to observe
his assailant was not considerable - less than a minute - and under
less than ideal viewing conditions. Moreover, the prosecutor knows
from experience that although stress may heighten one's powers of
observation, it also can interfere with a person's perception and mem-
ory.22 Moreover, Steven's identification of the defendant's photo-
20. There exists the possibility that the prosecutor might ask Fred to submit to a
polygraph examination as a means of determining his truthfulness. Based on my knowl-
edge and experience, most prosecutors do not use such tests in these circumstances be-
cause the tests do not have sufficient reliability and therefore do not add to the decision-
making process.
21. Although this factor may have no independent evidentiary value, it might justifia-
bly influence a prosecutor's evaluation of the case by enhancing the prosecutor's moral
confidence of Steven's accuracy.
22. Mitchell M. Burken et al., Experimental Studies of Psychological Stress in Man,
76 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 534 (1962); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, The Influence of
Arousal on Reliability of Testimony, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE: RECENT PSY-
CHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 235 (Brian R. Clifford & Sally M.
Lloyd-Bostock eds., 1983).
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graph came after he narrowed a large sample to two persons. This
selection process could demonstrate either that Steven was being ex-
traordinarily careful in making his selection, or unduly tentative and
uncertain as to which of those two persons actually robbed him.
Steven is positive that he has picked out the right person, but the
prosecutor also knows from experience and training that there is little
correspondence between an eyewitness's assurance and the accuracy
of that identification.23
There is also the issue of race. The prosecutor cannot avoid the
question of whether, and to what extent, the race of the victim and the
defendant might influence the accuracy of an identification. The pros-
ecutor knows that cross-racial identifications present special problems
that might undermine accuracy.24 The prosecutor also is aware of the
inherent difficulties faced by a defense lawyer in raising this subject
before a jury.25 Finally, from training and experience, the prosecutor
is acutely aware of the inherent dangers of eyewitness identifications,
i.e., the disproportionate impact such identifications can have upon
juries,26 and the numerous studies and case reports that have docu-
mented miscarriages of justice based on erroneous eyewitness
identifications.27
What standard should the prosecutor use in deciding whether to
charge Fred with robbery? Before pressing ahead with criminal
charges, a responsible prosecutor should be morally certain that the
defendant is guilty and that criminal punishment is appropriate.
Under the above analysis, the prosecutor has no basis other than her
own experience and intuition to trust Steven's identification. Should
the prosecutor charge Fred based on a visceral feeling that Steven is
correct? If the prosecutor is unable to articulate a factual doubt as to
Fred's guilt, ethical codes would allow the prosecutor to bring
23. Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEWITNESS TES-
TIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 155 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds.,
1984); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer
Anything About Their Relationship?, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1980); but see Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-15 (1977) (victim's positive assurance is relevant factor sup-
porting reliability of identification).
24. Roy S. Malpass & Jerome Kravits, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race,
13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 330-34 (1969).
25. The lawyer may be perceived as bringing up a racial stereotype - i.e., that all
persons of a particular race look alike. This suggestion may offend certain jurors.
26. ELIZABETH F. Lorrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The vagaries of eye-
witness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification."); C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrongful
Conviction and Public Policy, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 518, 524 (1986) (eyewitness misiden-
tification is the single most important factor leading to wrongful convictions).
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charges.28  However, the inability of the prosecutor to articulate a
doubt is neither surprising nor dispositive. The complainant has
stated quite firmly that "That's the man!" Such an assertion would
probably be sufficient to convince many prosecutors that charges are
appropriate.
Fred should not be charged with robbery. Fred may in fact be
guilty, and the prosecutor may believe that he probably is guilty, but
for all of the reasons outlined above, the prosecutor cannot be morally
certain that he is guilty. The prosecutor will try to explain to Steven
the grounds for her decision. Steven, the victim of a particularly hei-
nous crime, will probably be outraged by the decision. Crime victims,
the prosecutor will be told with biting sarcasm, have no rights, and
through this decision are being further victimized by an insensitive
and overly technical criminal justice system. Steven's reaction is per-
fectly understandable, and there is no satisfactory response. The
prosecutor will try to explain that she is required to serve different,
and conflicting, constituencies. Steven, Fred, and society are actual
constituencies. Values such as justice and the presumption of inno-
cence are abstract constituencies. The prosecutor will try to explain
that these latter values transcend individual and societal harm, and
involve a sensitive appreciation of the uses of power. That Steven may
not be convinced merely underscores the difficulty and complexity of
the decision, and why the prosecutor's task, as I have noted, "is more
exacting than that of any other public official." 29
B. The Rape Case
The robbery case presents a factual issue that does not involve an
evaluation of the victim's truthfulness. The rape case, on the other
hand, does involve the prosecutor's determination of truthfulness. As
in the robbery case, there is no evidence to corroborate Jane's story;
nor is there evidence to corroborate Ed's claim. The credibility issue
is compounded by the prosecutor's recognition, based on experience
and intuition, that.Jane and Ed could both honestly believe that they
are telling the truth about the incident. Their accounts concerning
28. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1992) (charges must
be supported by "probable cause"); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-
3.9(b)(i) (3d ed. 1992) ("reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty" a factor in
prosecutor's exercise of discretion); NDAA NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS
§ 42.3(a) (2d ed. 1991) ("doubt as to the accused's guilt" a factor in prosecutor's exercise
of discretion); NDAA NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 43.3 (2d ed. 1991)
(charges proper only when prosecutor "reasonably believes" they can be substantiated by
admissible evidence).
29. See GERSHMAN, supra note 2, at vii.
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the issues of consent and force are not so widely divergent as to make
this result unreasonable.
If the prosecutor cannot conclude to a moral certainty that Jane is
telling the truth, then under my proposed standard, the prosecutor
cannot charge Ed with rape. If, on the other hand, the prosecutor
believes to a moral certainty that Jane is telling the truth, and is mor-
ally certain that her account provides legally sufficient evidence of
lack of consent and force, then she could properly charge Ed with
rape. How does the prosecutor go about making that all-important
credibility determination? I am assuming that the prosecutor has ex-
perience in dealing with rape victims. Based on that experience, and
intuition stemming from Jane's dramatic description of misplaced
trust and betrayal, the prosecutor senses hallmarks of truth-telling.
Moreover, the prosecutor has probed the existence of a motive for
Jane to fabricate the charge, and has been unable to discern a motive
for Jane to lie.a°
Our legal system authorizes prosecutors to make such credibility
determinations, and when they do so, they cannot be second-guessed.
That a jury may not believe Jane, or have a reasonable doubt, should
not prevent the prosecutor from bringing the charge if the prosecutor
is morally certain that Ed is guilty of forcible rape. By the same to-
ken, the prosecutor's estimation that the evidence is not strong, and
the prediction that a jury might have a reasonable doubt of Ed's guilt,
are relevant factors in the charging decision. Although an acquittal
may result in a public perception of prosecutorial aggressiveness and a
commitment to protecting the rights of crime victims, an acquittal
also may result in a public perception of incompetence, vindictiveness,
and a misallocation of resources. Moreover, an acquittal may engen-
der public cynicism in the ability of courts to render justice, and dis-
suade victims from coming forward with complaints.
The prosecutor is sensitive to the political and legal issues involving
gender discrimination, the traditional reluctance of rape victims to
come forward with accusations, and the legal system's historical fail-
30. This inquiry into a possible motive for the complainant's accusation was a center-
piece in the recent rape prosecutions of William Kennedy Smith and Mike Tyson, and in
the testimony of Anita Hill in the United States Senate's confirmation hearing of Clar-
ence Thomas. See Robert Suro, Lawyers in Palm Beach Will Test Issues on Rape, N.Y.
TIMES, April 22, 1991, at A14; E.R. Shipp, Tyson Found Guilty on Three Counts as Indi-
anapolis Rape Trial Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992 at Al; The Thomas Confirmation:
Women In Senate Have Their Say Before the Vote Confirming Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 1991, at AIS.
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ure to treat nonstranger rape as rape.3 While the prosecutor should
not use charging powers to bring doubtful prosecutions, the prosecu-
tor also wants to inform the community that the prosecutor's office is
receptive to allegations of rape by nonstrangers, and that women
should not be discouraged from bringing such complaints by expect-
ing that they will be lightly dismissed.
On balance, Jane's account of the event should be accepted, largely
because of the manner in which she relates the facts, and also because
the prosecutor is unable to find a motive for her to lie. However, the
prosecutor is morally uncertain whether Ed used sufficient force or
the threat of force to accomplish his purpose. Jane clearly was scared,
and Ed used some degree of force. However, Jane's subjective evalua-
tion of the likelihood of harm, although a factor to be considered,
must be objectively reasonable.3 2 Ed was no doubt persistent in seek-
ing Jane's consent; whether he used the degree of force necessary to
transform aggressive persuasion into adequate physical force or the
threat of force is the moral question central to the charging decision.
The prosecutor should not charge Ed with forcible rape because she
cannot be morally certain that Ed used sufficient force, or the threat
of force, to satisfy the legal elements for rape. There exists the possi-
bility that Jane's compelling account of the events might cause a jury
to convict Ed. This occurrence would violate the prosecutor's duty to
seek justice, and to prevent the possibility that an innocent person is
convicted. This is not to discount the prosecutor's ability to select a
lesser charge that is morally consistent with the proof.33 The prosecu-
tor's decision once again would be unpopular. The prosecutor might
be accused of sexism. It is unlikely that the prosecutor's explanation
to Jane would be any more convincing than her explanation to Steven.
C. The Murder Case
The murder case presents the prosecutor with a third type of charg-
ing problem. Unlike the robbery and rape cases, the murder case
presents no dispute about the facts. The prosecutor knows what hap-
pened but is required to resolve a legal problem: whether these facts
establish a defense. The prosecutor faces a legal challenge to the
traditional approach to legal justification, or self-defense. Tradition-
ally, the defense of justification could be sustained only if the defend-
31. Beverly Balos & Mary L. Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger
Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV. 599, 604 (1991).
32. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).
33. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (1962) (sexual assault); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.20 (McKinney 1987) (sexual misconduct).
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ant reasonably believed that it was necessary to protect herself or
another person from the imminent use of deadly force.a4 How could
Fred imminently use deadly force if he was asleep? Why did Ella not
leave the apartment? These are predictable questions from a judge or
a jury. Even if the prosecutor concludes to a moral certainty that Ella
killed her husband based on her honest belief that the killing was nec-
essary to protect her life and that of her child, is the prosecutor none-
theless required to charge Ella with murder?
Most prosecutors, I believe, would conclude that Ella's justification
defense - even if honestly asserted - could not legally be sustained
because the element of imminency of danger is lacking. However, a
prosecutor with experience in domestic violence complaints, who has
studied the legal and scholarly literature surrounding the phenome-
non of spousal battering, who believes Ella's story and does not dis-
pute Dr. Wall's conclusions, would find it morally difficult to charge
Ella with murder. Should the prosecutor institute such a charge if she
is morally certain that Ella honestly believed that in order to protect
herself and her child she needed to kill her husband, that such claim is
supported by considerable social and psychological literature, 5 but if
she also knows that Ella would not be able to sustain the defense?
A more likely scenario might be that the prosecutor is morally un-
certain of the scope of the justification defense as it relates to Ella's
case. The prosecutor may be convinced that Ella honestly believed
that her life was being imminently threatened by her husband, but
that she acted unreasonably because she had other reasonable alterna-
tives to killing her husband. The prosecutor undoubtedly could locate
an expert witness to support that view. Based on her intuition and
experience, the prosecutor strongly believes that a jury would find
Ella guilty of murder, and that a judge would be required under the
law to impose a substantial mandatory sentence. However, the prose-
cutor also knows that thousands of battered women throughout the
country are incarcerated in prison under substantial sentences for
crimes similar to Ella's, whose claims of justification either were not
raised at trial, or were rejected by the jury. 6
34. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7
(1986).
35. Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered Woman's Defense": To-
wards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567 (1992).
36. A prosecutor who seeks to avoid making a difficult decision might believe that she
could present this case to a grand jury, advise the grand jury of the justification defense,
and allow the grand jury to take whatever action the grand jury believes is appropriate.
As noted above, however, this option is unrealistic, for it does not relieve the prosecutor
of the charging decision; it only disguises the actual source of decision-making authority.
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Under either scenario, Ella should not be charged with murder.
The prosecutor knows that the reasonableness of Ella's belief that she
was exposed to imminent danger will be the critical issue in her ability
to raise that defense. The prosecutor is aware that her unreasonable-
ness would as a matter of law prevent her from successfully raising
this defense. 37 However, even if Ella was unreasonable, the honesty of
her belief under the circumstances of her abuse makes the prosecutor
morally uncertain whether justice would be .served by charging Ella
with murder and subjecting her to substantial mandatory imprison-
ment. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor should look to
other charging options. The prosecutor could choose between bring-
ing no charges, or charging Ella with a lesser degree of homicide
based on her honest but unreasonable belief that killing her husband
was necessary to protect herself and her child.38 The prosecutor's
choice would depend on her assessment of Ella's conduct, the harm
Ella caused and the amount of punishment Ella should receive, the
impact of prosecution on the incidence of domestic violence, and the
impact of prosecution on the public's perception of ,the prosecutor's
commitment and fairness in domestic violence cases.
V. Conclusion
The subject of prosecutorial discretion in the charging process is
one of the most difficult problems in the administration of criminal
justice. The prosecutor is afforded substantial leeway in making
charging decisions, and there are few constraints on those decisions.
This Essay presented three hypothetical charging problems, suggested
a standard under which the prosecutor's charging discretion should
The grand jury will indict only if that is the prosecutor's recommendation. The prosecu-
tor. might also be tempted to institute murder charges, believing that she could induce any
rational defendant to plead guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter under a very
favorable sentence promise. This option assumes that- thedefendant will plead guilty, and
that the judge will impose the desired sentence. These assumptions are mere speculation.
Moreover, even if these assumptions are correct, the prosecutor is engaging in unethical
behavior when she uses her charging power not because it is the morally correct charge,
but as a leverage device to compel a defendant to plead guilty. Finally, a prosecutor
could simply avoid making the difficult moral decision and bring murder charges against
Ella, recognizing that if plea negotiations fail to produce a settlement, a jury will decide
the case on the merits. If the prosecutor is morally uncertain that Ella is guilty of mur-
der, then allowing a jury to convict her of murder would violate the prosecutor's duty to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.
37. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1) (McKinney 1987) (honest and reasonable
belief) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962) (honest belief).
38. This assumes that such charge is available. In New York, an honest but unreason-
able belief would provide no justification. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y.
1986).
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be guided, and offered conclusions on whether charges should be
brought. The charging problems raised by these hypothetical cases
involved the degree of moral confidence of the prosecutor in the accu-
racy of a witness, the credibility of a complainant, and the applicabil-
ity of a defense. The standard of moral certainty proposed by the
Essay to guide the prosecutor's charging decisions rests on the prose-
cutor's obligation to seek justice in a legal system that values protect-
ing the innocent more highly than convicting the guilty. That
standard both fits and reinforces the prosecutor's role as a gatekeeper
of justice.
